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Abstract 
This paper presents an account of the phenomenon of mental construal manifested in 
English expressions of stance through the distinction of clauses that are headed by 
subjects associated with two conceptual archetypes: participant (P) invoked by the first-
person pronoun (‘I am certain that’) and abstract setting (S) conveyed by anticipatory ‘it’ 
(‘It is certain that’). With recourse to the main theoretical points on the anchoring of 
linguistic meaning in the acts of mental construal and interactive coordination, the 
conducted analysis focuses on a corpus of about 350 examples that represent narrative 
and dialogic discourse in English-language fiction. It shown that the choice of stance 
expressions with P- and S-subjects is motivated by the distinctions that arise in discourse 
between actual and mentally represented types of reality, the contrast between reference-
making and viewing as types of cognitive operations and the associated narrative and 
dialogic strategies.  
Keywords: mental construal; stance; clausal subject; type of reality; cognitive operation. 
Résumé 
Cet article présente un compte-rendu du phénomène de compréhension mentale manifesté 
dans les expressions anglaises du point de vue par la distinction de propositions régies 
par des sujets associés à deux archétypes conceptuels: le participant (P) invoqué par le 
pronom de première personne (‘I am certain that’) et le paramètre abstrait (S) transmis 
par « it » anticipé (‘It is certain that’). En recourant aux principaux points théoriques sur 
l'ancrage du sens linguistique dans les actes de construction mentale et la coordination 
interactive, l'analyse menée se concentre sur un corpus d'environ 350 exemples qui 
représentent le discours narratif et dialogique dans des textes de fiction en anglais. Il a 
montré que le choix des expressions de point de vue avec les sujets P et S est motivé par 
les distinctions qui se posent dans le discours entre les types de réalité « réels » et 
mentalement représentés, le contraste entre la création de référence et la visualisation en 
tant que types d'opérations cognitives et le récit associé et les stratégies dialogiques. 





                                                             









Introduction: mental construal in the distinction of conceptual archetypes 
One of the cognitive abilities that is regularly reflected in uses of linguistic items and 
expressions is mental imagery, or construal. According to the basic assumptions of cognitive 
grammar, as presented in Langacker (2000a, 2000b), mental construal consists in the ability to 
conceive and portray the same situation in alternate ways, with recourse to different linguistic 
means that evoke distinct facets of the described situation alongside such parameters as 
specificity, perspective, prominence, background and some others. There is convergent 
evidence that construal is involved in the meaning structure of a wide variety of linguistic 
expressions that can both convey some conceptual content and reflect one’s subjective 
attitudes, or stances, towards that content. For instance, in English the expression of 
epistemic, perceptual and emotional stance can involve choosing between alternative stance 
clauses like those in (1), (2) and (3), respectively: 
(1) I am certain that – It is certain that.  
(2) I felt as if – It was as if.  
(3) I am glad that – It is good that.  
The above clauses are treated among linguistic markers of stance in English which occur, 
according to the corpus studies of Biber & Finegan (1989), Biber, Johansson et al. (2004: 
965-986), across a variety of styles and registers. As shown in the studies on the expression of 
stance in English conversation (Kärkkäinen, 2003; Kärkkäinen, 2006, 2007; Keisanen, 2007), 
academic writing (Hyland, 2005; Hyland & Tse, 2005) and in various kinds of texts in 
different languages (Berman, 2004), the speaker’s choices in communicating his or her 
positioning towards the content expressed are dependent on such factors as the type of 
discourse, the context and the interactive dimension of communication. These factors are 
analyzed in the studies on stance from the point of view of their relatedness to the meaning 
and functional properties of stance expressions taken as a whole and included into particular 
contexts of oral or written communication. However, the choice of composite expressions of 
stance like those in (1) – (3) may be influenced – to a greater or lesser degree – by a particular 
conceptual and/or communicative contribution of the expressions’ constituents, such as 
clausal subjects and predicates (as suggested, for instance, in Langacker, 2000a: 152). 
From a cognitive perspective, the contrast between the clausal subjects in (1) – (3), can be 
described as a distinction between two conceptual archetypes: participant and setting 
(Langacker, 1987). Generally, a conceptual archetype is defined in Langacker’s theory of 
cognitive grammar (Langacker, 2000a: 24) as a conceptual structure which is grounded in 
experience and which includes various sorts of “the experience of perceiving, of thinking and 
of feeling emotions”. It is assumed, according to the suggested view, that the conceptual 
archetype “participant” is a discrete dynamic entity, typically a person that plays a key role in 
the structuring of a (clausal) situation or event. The archetype “setting” in turn is 
characterized as a kind of location or region that has spatial and/or temporal extension. It is 
considered that this conceptual archetype can take the form of abstract setting, or mental 
expanse that delineates “a scope of awareness” in a particular context of discourse 
(Langacker, 2011: 206 – 208). 
In examples (1) – (3), the first-person pronoun points to a participant, or stance-taker. On the 
other hand, anticipatory it indicates in each case the (respective) stance-taker’s scope of 
awareness, or abstract setting. Consequently, the I and the it in these examples are not entirely 





dissociated, but rather, related to each other metonymically: whereas the participant [P]-
pronoun (I) invokes a person as the subject of judgment-making, the setting [S]-pronoun (it) 
makes reference to the person’s mental sphere activated in a discourse. In actual usage events, 
a speaker can either choose between clauses headed by P- or S-subjects or use them 
alternatively, as in (4) and (5): 
(4) You feel as if the whole universe were hostile […]. Your feeling of security vanishes, and 
it seems that everything about your life is horribly brittle and destructible (Wilson, 2000: 
125).  
(5) It was interesting […] to note that Fleischmann’s obvious tenderness for her […] 
communicated itself to Reich and myself […]. I should also note that the lust experienced by 
Reich and myself was not the usual male desire to possess a strange female […] (Wilson, 
2000: 147). 
Obviously in (4), the clauses headed by P- vs. S-subjects (you and it, respectively) convey 
very similar perceptual and epistemic stances of the I-narrator. In (5), the similarity of modal 
and emotional stances expressed by the clauses with it vs. I is stressed through the use of also 
(in the second clause) as a marker of cohesion. 
Alternative uses of clauses with P- and S-subjects are also to be found in dialogic interactions, 
as in the following fragment of conversation: 
(6) ‘[…] But did you never have the feeling he got assistance from above as well as from the 
agents he afterwards acquired?’‘No. No, I never did. It never occurred to me.’ (Le Carré, 
2000: 78).  
The dialogue in (6) illustrates the case of alternations in the expression of uncertain 
supposition. Whereas the question is expressed by a P-subject clause (Did you never have the 
feeling), the answer contains both P- and S-subject clauses used synonymously (I never did. It 
never occurred to me). 
The question that examples like (4), (5) and (6) posit is the motivation for the speaker-
conceptualizer to start a stance-clause by invoking a stance-taker as a participant in the use of 
a referring expression (typically a personal pronoun) or by the implicit reference to the stance-
taker’s scope of awareness, or setting, in the use of non-referential anticipatory it. 
1. Aims, data and theoretical prerequisites of the study 
The aim of the proposed paper is to reveal the nature and discourse motivations of mental 
construal manifested in choosing the above mentioned stance-clauses headed by either P- or 
S-subjects. To this end, the following questions are addressed: (i) the discursively relevant 
facets of the conceptual content that are invoked through alternations of P- and S-subjects; (ii) 
the nature of contextual factors that make the use of a particular stance-clause felicitous or 
non-felicitous.  
With the general discourse orientation of the study, the paper takes up the following 
theoretical points: (a) the claims substantiated in Garrod and Pickering (2004, 2013), Stewart, 
Gapenne & Di Paolo (2010) on the crucial role of dialogic interactions and coordinating 
activities in the generation, shaping and enactment of meaning, in particular linguistic 
meaning, as shown in Bottineau (2010) ; (b) the assumption on the anchoring of linguistic 





meaning in the acts of speech activity that is structured by motives, purposes and speech 
performance as such, with the latter constituted by speech actions and speech operations 
(Leontiev, 1975, 1981, 2006), including sign operations of designation, or giving a name, and 
predication, or attributing a property to a designated thing or phenomenon (Kubryakova, 
1986).  
The proposed analysis is based on data that come from literary texts, namely, the detective 
novel “The Spy who Came In from the Cold” by John Le Carré (2000), the book of stories 
“The Rendezvous and Other Stories” by Daphne Du Maurier (2008) and the philosophical 
and psychological novel “The Mind Parasites” by Colin Wilson (2000). The overall corpus of 
correlative stance-clauses like those in (1) – (3) includes about 350 examples that occur both 
in dialogical and narrative parts of the texts. 
Generally, stance expressions in which the speakers (including the I-narrator) pronounce their 
judgments about the described events are used rather frequently in all the mentioned texts. In 
some cases the correlative clauses occur in different parts of narration, which implies the 
narrator’s choice of one available expression over another one, as it happens in (7) and (8): 
(7) Next morning, at breakfast, we were glad to see that Fleischman was in sparkling spirits. 
(Wilson, 2000: 113). 
(8) It was a pleasure to see how quickly he became transformed – to watch the energy and 
optimism straightening his shoulders and taking the lines out of his face (Wilson, 2000 : 228). 
Similarly, one of the alternative stance clauses may be chosen in dialogic discourse, as shown 
in (9) and (10): 
(9) ‘I know what you are going to tell me. But did you never have the feeling he got 
assistance from above as well as from the agents he afterwards acquired?’ (Le Carré, 2000: 
78). 
(10) ‘Was it your impression that the agent had been operating for some time before the first 
payment was made? […]’ (Le Carré, 2000: 87). 
The analyzed texts also contain more subtle cases like (4), (5) and (6) mentioned previously 
and the one in (11) where the stance-clauses with the P- and S-subjects (I and it, respectively) 
co-occur in two subsequent clauses: 
(11) That evening […] I was feeling a little lonely, and was glad to talk. Even the subject of 
the excavations had ceased to be unbearable to me, and it gave me pleasure to tell him the 
“inside story of our work (Wilson, 2000: 60). 
In (11), the choice of the stance-clauses with P- and S-subjects is accompanied by the explicit 
contrast of the latter, which may be indicative of some discursively relevant cognitive 
distinctions. 
In addressing the previously mentioned research questions the subsequent analysis of 
linguistic data in section 3 focuses on the following two issues: (a) the possibilities of the 
communicative and syntactic structuring of stance-clauses with the chosen P- vs. S-subjects; 
(b) the discursive motivations and/or purposes that underlie the choice and (sometimes) 
contrastive uses of clauses. 
2. The participant-setting distinction in the context of speech activity  
The regularities of the communicative perspective and the syntactic sequencing of a clause 
with a chosen subject (here: P or S) are reflected both in the choice of linguistic items that 





collocate with the subject in question and in the potential for the discursive structuring of the 
content conveyed. 
2.1. Predications with P- vs. S-subjects: felicity conditions and constraints 
The choice of linguistic units and their sequencing in predications with P- and S-subjects 
manifest three important distinctions.  
First, predications that can be attributed to P- and S-subjects are not totally identical in the 
expression of epistemic stance. Similarities between the respective clauses are usually fairly 
obvious in cases of expressing the epistemic state of belief or certainty, as in (12): 
(12) I am convinced / believe that – It is my conviction / belief that. (Ibid.) 
The alternation of stance-clauses in the expression of the stance-taker’s certainty occurs, for 
instance, in (13) where the speaker switches from the P-subject clause (we have become 
convinced that) to the one with the S-subject (it is our conviction that): 
(13) “But in recent weeks we have become convinced that we are facing something far more 
dangerous than a curse. It is our conviction that we have disturbed the sleep of forces that 
once dominated the earth […].” (Wilson, 2000 : 154). 
However, the epistemic state of (one’s individual) knowledge or doubt can be attributed only 
to a P-subject (such as I), but not to the S-subject, expressed by anticipatory it, cf.: 
(14) I know / doubt that - *It is my knowledge / doubt that. (Ibid.) 
The demonstrated constraint shows that the S-subject it which invokes a stance-taker’s scope 
of awareness, or mentally represented region, cannot be equated with the actual state of affairs 
that makes the content of one’s knowledge or doubt. On the other hand, as shown in (12) and 
(13), mentally represented content that underlies a person’s convictions or beliefs can be 
easily attributed to anticipatory it. To put it more generally, the choice of a stance-clause with 
a P- vs. S-subject in a discourse presupposes one of the formats in which a subsequent 
proposition is regarded: the format of actual reality (with a P-subject) or mentally represented 
reality (with the S-subject it). 
Second, using a P-subject in a stance-clause always involves the operation of reference-
making to a stance-taker. Reference-making is always in a communicative focus of a P-
subject clause and the use of negation in such a clause entails a change of reference. Thus, a 
negative transformation of (15) in (16) results in negating the expressed epistemic stance and 
in switching to another stance-taker: 
(15) “I’m not sure, but I think we got a response.” (Wilson, 2000: 227). 
(16) “I don’t think we got a response.”(Ibid.) 
By contrast, applying negation to the stance-clause it seems which is very close to I think in 
terms of the epistemic attitude expressed does not entail a change of the mental structure 
signified by it, cf: 
(17) It now seems absurd that neither of us anticipated the consequences of our discovery. 
(Wilson, 2000: 43). 
(18) It doesn’t seem absurd that neither of us anticipated the consequences of our discovery. 
(Ibid.) 





In (18), the negative particle not bears on the attributed stance (does not seem absurd) and on 
reference to the implied stance-taker (‘it’ does not seem absurd to someone). However, the S-
subject it evokes the same scope of mental awareness. In both (17) and (18), anticipatory it 
identifies the activated mental sphere as a whole, which is followed by its further 
specification through the attributed stance (seems / does not seem absurd) and the subsequent 
complement clause. What comes into a communicative focus with the S-subjects here is the 
way the mentally represented picture (it) is identified through a particular epistemic 
positioning. Therefore, the choice between the expression of stance with P- and S-subjects in 
(15) and (17) is dependent on a discursively relevant distinction between the operations of 
reference (with P-subjects) and identification (with S-subjects). 
Third, predications that can be attributed to P- vs. S-subjects differ in the way they are 
elaborated in representing a stance-taking event. Thus, P-subjects activate a typical schema of 
an event that has a temporal slot. In a P-subject stance-clause the slot can be filled by a 
temporal expression that refers to a particular point in time when the event happened, for 
instance: 
(19) But half an hour later I felt as though my mind was supporting a load the size of Mount 
Everest (Wilson, 2000: 26). 
In (19), the adverbial half an hour later puts the stance-taking event I felt on a temporal plane 
with respect to another event described in the text.  
Unlike P-subjects, anticipatory it invites a stance-predication that can specify a way in which 
the stance-taking event is internally experienced by the stance-taker. One of the most frequent 
experiences that happened to the I-narrator of C. Wilson’s novel was that of unexpectedness. 
This is reflected in frequent uses of the adverb suddenly in S-subject clauses, as in (18): 
(20) It was suddenly as if we were in the middle of the noisiest crowd the world has ever 
known (Wilson, 2000: 231). 
The distinction manifested in the attribution of very similar perceptual stances to P- vs. S-
subjects (I felt as though – It was as if) in (19) and (20) points to the stance-taker’s choice 
between a participant as a constituent of an event-schema (alongside its other constituents 
including temporal ones) and abstract setting (or scope of mental awareness) as a constituent 
of an internal experience. 
All the three mentioned distinctions between P- and S-subjects occur in the acts of attributing 
stance-predications to them in discourse. Given that any discursive or utterance-generation 
event presents a systemic whole that is driven (as shown, for instance, in Sidorov (2009; 
2011) with reference to linguistic material) by the mechanism of mutual alignment and 
coordination of the speaker-addressee speech activities, choosing one of the mentioned 
discursively relevant facet associated with the participant-setting distinction would also point 
to a contextually anchored communicative choice of the stance-taker. 
2.2. The factor of adjustment to the utterance comprehension in choosing between P- vs. 
S-subjects 
There are two addressees of the stance-taker’s speech activity that are presupposed in the 
analyzed texts and whose comprehension (presenting also a type of speech activity) is at 
issue: one is a (generalized) reader of the text and the other is a fictional character involved in 
a dialogue with another character (including the I-narrator). Ensuring the comprehension of 
the stance-taker’s positioning on the part of both addressees is effected through the stance-
taker’s resort to communicative techniques that are adjusted to the context in which a 





particular stance is expressed. The language of the texts allows to distinguish three basic 
communicative factors that motivate the choice of P- or S-subjects in the expression of stance. 
It will be shown below that all these factors are directly related to the three mentioned 
distinctions between the respective conceptual archetypes. 
First, by enacting the actuality format of reality in using a P-subject the stance-taker 
emphasizes the factivity status of the stance-taking event as a whole. By contrast, the use of 
the S-subject it amounts to the activation of the focus of attention in one’s positioning towards 
a certain state of affairs described in the subsequent clause. The distinction between the 
communicative strategy of actualizing one’s stance vs. that of establishing the focus of 
attention can be the source of rhetorical effects in oral speech, as in (21): 
(21) And now Fleischman suddenly remarked: 
“We’ve learned one interesting thing about the parasites. It’s wrong to think of them as 
existing in some kind of space. The crowd attacking me here must have been more or less the 
same crowd who were attacking you two in Diyarbakir […].” 
This had also struck myself and Reich earlier. But Fleischman saw another consequence. 
“In that case, we’re mistaken to think about the mind in terms of physical space. […]. They 
don’t have to travel to get from here to Diyarbakir. They are already in both places at once.” 
(Wilson, 2000: 143). 
In (21), the alternation in the expression of the same epistemic truth positioning with S- and 
P-subjects (it’s wrong to think – we’re mistaken to think) allows the stance-taker to switch 
from the summary mental image in the stance-taking event (it) to the actual stance-taker (we) 
who is supposed to take (further) steps on the basis of the actual positioning. 
The actualization of the stance-taker’s positioning may also be important in the expression of 
emotion, as in the following example: 
(22) ‘He tried to kiss me, and was, well, rather rough. I was so surprised that I wasn’t 
prepared, you see, and – Oh, I hate telling you all this!’ (Du Maurier, 2008 : 153). 
The example in (22) describes a situation with two participants (referred to as he and I). The 
communicative necessity to present both participants as equally involved in the described 
situation motivates the use of a P-subject (I) in the expression of stance: I was surprised that.  
Unlike (22), the example in (23) has only one prominent participant – the girl mentioned at 
the start of the initial sentence. The stance-taker, Mrs. Ellis, who is making judgments about 
the girl is represented with a lesser degree of salience. This motivates the establishment of the 
focus of attention (it) rather than making direct reference to the stance-taker in the expression 
of surprise (it was a wonder): 
(23) An ignorant, silly sort of girl, thought Mrs. Ellis. It was a wonder she had passed her test 
into the force. She thought they only employed intelligent women (Du Maurier, 2008 : 261). 
The actualization of one’s stance acquires a high degree of relevance when the expressed 
subjective positioning is no less important than situations to which a particular stance is taken. 
For instance, in (24) the speaker’s emotional stance of relief is actualized through self-
reference as a participant (I) in a highly emotional situation: 
(24) ‘I’m sincerely relieved he is not on the committee,’ stated the Very Reverend Travers. It 
would put us all in a very embarrassing position. I feel it my duty to inquire into the whole 
business. […]’ (Du Maurier, 2008: 74). 
In the given example the speaker is emotionally involved in the described situation, which is 
conveyed lexically by means of words and expressions referring to emotions (such as “be 





relieved”, “feel”, “a very embarrassing position”). On the other hand, in cases when it is a 
particular state of affairs which is at issue, rather than a stance towards the described 
situation, the choice of a stance clause with it appears to be more appropriate, as in (25): 
(25) They would shoot Fiedler; that’s what the woman said. Why did it have to be Fiedler – 
why not the old man who asked the questions, or the fair one in the front row between the 
soldiers, the one who smiled all the time […]. It comforted her that Leamas and Fiedler were 
on the same side (Le Carré, 2000 : 202). 
Second, the distinction between the operations of reference-making and identification 
involved in the differentiated uses of P- and S-subjects is usually triggered off by the stance-
taker’s dialogic choice between subjectivizing the reported stance in the first case and, on the 
contrary, objectivizing the stance in question by giving it a general identification (it). For 
instance, in (26), the epistemic event of mental apprehension (began to see) is presented with 
reference to specific individuals (we), which is aimed at establishing (cohesive) links with 
other individual events happening to the characters involved: 
(26) Reich said: “But if the parasites are between you and the source, they’re probably 
obstructing you somehow.”  
We now began to see that this was a real possibility. The parasites had always used this 
“obstructing” method […]. We had learnt how to prevent this: by penetrating to those depths 
of the mind from which the parasites normally operated.” (Wilson, 2000 : 194). 
Contrastively to (26), the description of a similar epistemic event in a clause with the S-
subject it (it became clear) in (27) is motivated by the dialogic technique of sharing the 
activated mental picture (it): 
(27) It became clear that there is a fundamental mistake about ordinary human existence – as 
absurd as trying to fill a bath with the plug out, or driving a car with the hand brake on 
(Wilson, 2000: 100). 
The use of anticipatory it in the above example fits the generic construal of the situation 
described in the subordinate clause and contributes to its presentation in a more objective 
manner. 
The use of anticipatory it for objectivizing one’s stance is communicatively significant when 
the scope of mental awareness is intended to be shared by the participants of a conversation, 
as in (28): 
(28) ‘Darling, it’s good to be alive, isn’t it? We’re going to be happy, you and I, happy – 
happy.’ (Du Maurier, 2008 : 197). 
In (28), the dialogic appeal of the speaker (and stance-taker) is meant to activate one 
commonly shared mental picture (it) that can be negotiated or discussed (isn’t it). In this 
context, the stance-taker’s possible self-reference through the use of the pronoun we (We are 
happy to be alive, aren’t we?) would subjectivize the expressed positive stance and would 
sound less interactively oriented. On the other hand, when a stance-taker’s positive 
positioning cannot be the object of discussion, as in self-presentation in (29), the use of the 
requisite personal pronoun becomes the only possibility: 
(29) ‘I am pleased to present myself, Fritz Lieber, secretary of the International Society of 
Letters. Welcome to Geneva.’ (Du Maurier, 2008 : 119). 
The contrast between clauses with P- and S-subjects as manifestation of the distinction 
between the discourse strategies of subjectivizing vs. objectivizing one’s speech is also 
obvious in cases when the subjects are followed by modal predicates. Thus, the attribution of 





the modal predicate should think to the P-subject I in (30) serves to convey the uncertainty of 
the specific speaker in the expression of his epistemic positioning: 
(30) ‘[…] Your car turned into Bywater Street and our agent reported that you were dropped 
at number nine. That happens to be Smiley’s house.’ 
‘That’s drivel,’ Leamas declared. ‘I should think I went to the Eight Bells; it’s a favorite pub 
of mine’ (Le Carré, 2000 : 180). 
Owing to the specific reference of the P-subject I in the above example the stance clause with 
the modal predicate as a whole (I should think) is understood as a specific subjective 
positioning of the speaker. By contrast, the collocation of anticipatory it with a modal 
predicate in a correlative epistemic clause (it would seem) in (31) has no individualizing 
effects: 
(31) Annette Limoges lived, it would seem, only to retain what Scrivener cared to send her 
[…] (Du Maurier, 2008: 102). 
The context of free indirect discourse representing the character’s inner speech in which the 
above example occurs suggests that this very character (Scrivener) is the subject of the 
mentioned epistemic positioning. However, similar to the uses of it as S-subjects in (21), (23) 
and (25) the use of the pronoun in this case introduces a summary mental picture, which 
activates the interpretation of the subsequent modal predicate (would seem) as referring to the 
way the picture could be imagined independently of one’s individual perceptions. This kind of 
interpretation invites the alignment of any (potential) reader with the expressed stance. 
Third, the distinction between P- and S-subjects as constituents of event-schemas vs. those of 
internal experiences acquires communicative significance through the stance-taker’s choice of 
either reporting a stance-event by filling its “slots”, including a participant’s slot, or 
commenting on this event by focusing on the activated mental sphere (it) and specifying the 
nature of experience in the stance-predication. As mentioned previously, the reporting mode 
of presenting a stance-event helps to associate its participant with the temporal location of the 
event in question and thus – to connect all the events in a network of their dynamic 
interrelationships. Thus, similar to the case in example (19), the report of a stance-event with 
the P-subject he in (32) allows to describe the event in question (“having an idea”) in a series 
of other events that follow each other in a temporal sequence: 
(32) Too agitated to remain on the balcony, he went back into his room, and flinging himself 
in a chair began to read over the notes for his lecture. It was no use, though. He could not 
concentrate. Then he had an idea that she might, after all, have arrived back at the hotel […] 
(Du Maurie, 2008: 106). 
The epistemic experience of having an idea in the above example is presented as one event in 
a chain of others: the character (he) went back into his room, began to read over the notes, 
could not concentrate, had an idea that. The description of a similar epistemic state by a 
clause with anticipatory it (it occurred to him) produces somewhat different narrative effects: 
(33) A third martini did little to calm him; being a moderate drinker at all times, this sudden 
taking to spirits produced an intensity of fever. It occurred to him that some disaster might 
have overtaken her […] (Du Maurie, 2008: 107). 
The clause with anticipatory it in the above example does not relate the described epistemic 
state to the previously mentioned internal experience (the character’s feeling “an intensity of 
fever”), but rather, introduces a comment on that experience. 





Similar to (32), the use of a P-subject clause in (34) helps to present the experienced 
perceptual stance (felt as if) as directly related (here: through a causal link) to the previously 
mentioned event: 
(34) And then the realization came to me with such searing force that I felt as if I had been 
struck by lightning (Wilson, 2000 : 72). 
Unlike (34), a comment on a similar perceptual stance-event in (35) motivates the choice of a 
clause with the S-subject (it was as if), which, again, places the focus on the activated domain 
of mental awareness (it) and zooms in on the event, rather than relates it to the previously 
mentioned one: 
(35) To begin with, the Graus protested “One at a time.” Then, suddenly, it was as if we fell 
into step with Reich […]. (Wilson, 2000: 146). 
Despite the use of the temporal indicator then in the above example, there is no obvious 
temporal link with the previously mentioned event, but rather, a close look at (or a comment 
on) the internal perceptual experience. 
The discussed contrast between clauses with P- and S-subjects as associated with the 
distinction between event-frames and internal experiences, respectively, is reflected in 
different functions of the adverb now in these clauses. Thus, the use of now in a P-subject 
clause, as in (36), puts the described epistemic event (was aware) on a temporal plane with 
respect to the previously mentioned event (he said): 
(36) “You know,” he said, and he was aware now that his words were a little slurred (Du 
Maurier, 2008: 110). 
The use of now with the preceding and in the above example signals that there is a point in 
time (now) that separates the stance event (he was aware) from the prior speech event (he 
said). This use of now fits the definition of the adverb that is formulated in Cambridge 
Dictionary of the English Language in the following way: “used in stories or reports of past 
events to describe a new situation or event” (Cambridge Online, sv).  
Unlike (36), the use of now in the example below introduces the point at which the prior 
event(s) are interpreted rather than located in a temporal sequence: 
(37) London must have gone raving mad. He’d told them – that was the joke – he’d told them 
to leave her alone. And now it was clear that […] from the very moment he left England […] 
some fool had gone round […] paying the bills, settling the grocer, the landlord; above all Liz 
(Le Carré, 2000: 191). 
In (37), the clause with anticipatory it construes the epistemic positioning of the character (it 
was clear that) as an internal experience where now marks the point of mental apprehension 
which results from the analysis of the prior event (he’d told them to leave her alone). In this 
context, the adverb now can be defined in the following way: “used when describing a 
situation that is the result of what someone just said or did” (see Cambridge Dictionary 
Online, sv). The connotation of result that is introduced by now into the sentence as a whole 
comes from the implication of mental awareness and the associated sense of mental 
processing, or analysis, that is activated by anticipatory it in this discursive context. The 
connotation of analysis, in turn, contributes to the realization of narrative strategy of 
commenting on the epistemic experience by contrast with the strategy of reporting a similar 
experience (it was clear that - he was aware that) in a temporal sequence. 
 






The conducted study of alternations in uses of stance-clauses headed by subjects that refer to 
either participants or abstract setting as two distinct types of conceptual archetypes has shown 
that cognitive differences between the linguistic units signifying the two conceptual structures 
(typically, personal pronouns vs. anticipatory it) are rooted in the discursively relevant facets 
of these structures and are motivated in actual discourse by communicative distinctions made 
in the context of speech. It has been established that the choice of stance expressions with 
participant- and setting-subjects is motivated, respectively, by the distinctions that arise in 
discourse between actual and mentally represented types of reality, the contrast between 
reference-making and viewing as types of cognitive events and the distinction between event-
schemas and mental experiences. As evidenced by linguistic data, these discursively relevant 
distinctions are related to narrative and dialogic strategies that are used in literary texts for the 
expression of stance with the alternative stance-clauses. 
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